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Payment systems play a very important role in ensuring the safe and efficient transfer of deposits and
financial instruments. Consequently, the failure of these systems may have a destabilising impact. Business
continuity plans have thus been developed to ensure their robustness. However, their smooth functioning
is also contingent on the capacity of participants to submit their payment orders. The Banque de France,
in its role of overseer of the French payment systems, conducted a study with a view to enhancing its
understanding of the consequences and the impact of the technical default of a participant in such systems.
This study, carried out using a simulator of the functioning of the Paris Net Settlement (PNS) large-value
payment system, operated by the CRI (Centrale des Règlements Interbancaires), shows that the technical
default of a participant in this system has negative consequences on the smooth running of the system.
Indeed, a situation in which a major participant, in the wake of a technical incident, is unable to submit its
payment orders in a normal fashion to its counterparties in PNS, could further exacerbate congestion in
the system and result in almost 10% of payments being rejected among non-defaulting participants.
The consequences of a technical default could nevertheless be greatly reduced if the participants set
their bilateral sender limits at a lower level than that currently observed and if they reacted rapidly to
information indicating a technical default by reducing their bilateral limits with the defaulting participant
(defaulter).114 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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O
ver the past few years, the various parties
concerned (supervisory authorities,
financial system operators and users) have
stepped up efforts to increase the resilience of critical
infrastructures to ensure the smooth functioning of
systems in the major financial centres. The different
measures taken are part of a single approach that
aims notably to ensure that sufficient continuity of
service is guaranteed for these infrastructures in the
event of a major disruption. Operators of interbank
transfer systems (securities settlement systems,
payment systems) have undertaken large-scale
efforts to improve the soundness of their own
infrastructures. However, their smooth functioning
is also contingent on the capacity of participants to
submit their payments normally.
This study, conducted by the Banque de France, is
part of a larger review of operational risk and sets
out to better apprehend the consequences and the
impact on the functioning of payment systems of
the technical default of one of its participants, when
it prevents the latter, following an incident (such as
the failure of its access platform), from making
payments to its counterparties. Analysing such
failures is part of the Banque de France's payment
systems oversight duties, whose aim is to ensure
their security and efficiency in accordance with
Article L141-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code.1
This study focuses on the analysis of the impact of
the technical default of a participant in
the large-value payment system PNS, using a
simulator of the functioning of payment systems
developed by the Banque de France. PNS was chosen
for this analysis because of its risk management
functionalities, which are representative of those of
the new generation of large-value payment systems
operating on a real-time net settlement basis.
The latter are increasingly being used throughout
the world. These type of functionalities can be found
in TARGET2, for example, which the Eurosystem
has scheduled to go live in 2007, to replace its current
network of large-value payment systems linked to
TARGET. The results obtained highlighted the fact
that the technical default of a major participant in
the system would have a substantial impact on
transfers between the other participants, but that it
would also be possible to reduce these consequences
under certain conditions.
Sections 1 and 2 of this study describe the main
characteristics of the PNS system and the
methodology used. Section 3 illustrates the impact
of different parameters on its functioning such as
the amount of liquidity submitted by participants
or the value of the bilateral limits set by them.
The consequences of the technical default of the
largest debtor in PNS are analysed in Section 4.
It shows that the impact of the technical default of a
participant may be mitigated if the other participants
in the system respond appropriately, in particular
by setting apposite bilateral limits with the defaulter.
1| PRESENTATION OF PNS
Paris Net Settlement (PNS) is a large-value payment
system operated by the CRI (Centrale des
Règlements Interbancaires).2 It provides real-time
settlement of transactions on central bank money
accounts that must always remain in credit.
PNS is linked to Transferts Banque de France (TBF),
the real-time gross settlement system and French
component of TARGET operated by the Banque de
France. TBF is mainly used for the settlement of
monetary policy operations, operations processed by
post-market infrastructures (securities clearing and
settlement systems), operations processed by SIT
(retail payment system), and for urgent payments,
1 “The Banque de France shall ensure the smooth operation and the security of payment systems within the framework of the tasks of the
European System of Central Banks relating to the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems”
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and payments to other components of TARGET.
PNS is mainly used for the settlement of less urgent
large-value domestic payments. Participants start and
end the day with zero account balances in PNS. The
link between TBF and PNS enables participants to
transfer, without delay, liquidity from their account
in TBF to their account in PNS in the way that best
suits their cash flow needs: each participant usually
makes an initial injection of liquidity into PNS at the
beginning of the day and may then add further sums
or return liquidity to TBF depending on the nature of
its dealings throughout the day. At the end of the day,
participants account balances in PNS are automatically
transferred back to their accounts in TBF.
The description of the main characteristics of PNS,
in particular the terms and conditions of settlement,
sheds light on the factors contributing to the fluidity
of payments executed via this system, under normal
conditions, and on the tools available to participants
for managing the effects of a technical default.
Payment orders in PNS are settled in real time if
they satisfy a certain number of criteria (balances
must remain positive, and the FIFO rule3 and
bilateral limits must be observed), or are placed in
a queue if these criteria are not met. Queued
payments are settled using three different processes
that observe the constraints of bilateral
limits.The first two also observe the FIFO rule:
• queue scanning, which involves, once an account
has been credited, the system checking whether any
queued transactions on that account can then be
settled;
• bilateral optimisation, which is triggered whenever
a payment is added to the queue. The system
examines all the queued transactions between the
sending participant and the receiving participant, and
attempts to process some offsetting transactions
simultaneously;
• multilateral optimisation, which is automatically
launched twice a day as well as on the initiative of the
system operator, and makes it possible to resolve
gridlock by checking whether a large number of
payments can be simultaneously settled.
By simultaneously settling a number of payments
that partially offset each other, the last
two mechanisms make it possible to significantly
reduce the amount of liquidity in central bank
money required for the smooth functioning of
PNS, compared with a system that only offers
gross settlement.
Bilateral sender limits are set freely by each
participant vis-à-vis its counterparties, thus
allowing them to manage liquidity flows and
control risks. A bilateral limit is the net amount of
money a participant is willing to pay another
participant before being paid back. Correct use of
such limits enables participants to limit liquidity
flows to counterparties withholding payments.
There are many reasons why a participant may
make late payments. One reason, discussed in this
study, would be a technical incident that disrupted
the smooth functioning of the participant's access
to the system. Another reason could be of a more
strategic nature: given that intraday liquidity has
a cost, a participant may be tempted to wait to be
paid by its counterparties before submitting its
payments, so as to benefit from a free ride on the
liquidity of others (incoming payments).
3 FIFO (“First in First out”) means that priority is given to payments according to the order in which they arrive in the system. Nevertheless, a
threshold of EUR 1 million exists below which payments bypass the FIFO rule in order to avoid overloading the settlement process. Payments of
under EUR 1 million may therefore be settled directly, even if they are submitted after others already in the queue.
Gridlock
Gridlock is a situation in which several payments
cannot be settled individually but can be settled
simultaneously. An example of simple gridlock is when
three participants A, B, C, all have a liquidity of 10,
and A has to make a payment of 15 to B, B a payment
of 20 to C and C a payment of 25 to A. In this case, no
payment can be settled even though each participant
has sufficient liquidity for the simultaneous settlement
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2| METHODOLOGY
This study uses a simulator of TBF and PNS payment
systems, developed by the Banque de France in
Java script, which almost identically reproduces the
functioning of these systems.4 The simulations are
based on 20 actual days of PNS operation5 in January
2004, and are presented in Microsoft Access tables.
The simulator reproduces the actual functioning of
PNS by processing payments one by one in the same
order in which they actually arrive in the days
considered. It produces, at the end of each day, a
new table showing each payment simulated, the
time of settlement (or, as the case may be, whether
it was rejected at the end of the day), if the payment
was settled in real time or placed in a queue when
it entered the system – and, in this case, the reason
for it being placed in the queue (exceeding the
bilateral limit, insufficient balance, respecting
FIFO), as well as the process that enables settlement
of the payment (real-time settlement, queue
scanning, bilateral optimisation or multilateral
optimisation). By choosing a full month of operation,
it was possible to smooth the seasonal effects over
the month. Indeed, payment flows may differ
significantly over the course of the month
(in particular in the run-up to the end of the reserve
maintenance period), however they remain almost
identical from one month to the next. Moreover,
January 2004 can be considered to be characteristic
of a “normal” month of operation for the system. In
total, over 1,200 simulations were carried out,
enabling us to test a large number of parameters.
The impact of technical default of one of its
participants on the operation of PNS was tested using
different scenarios. Technical default is understood
to mean the inability of a participant to make its
payments to its counterparties in the system in the
wake of a technical incident that affects it. It may
however continue to receive payments in a normal
manner.6 There may be many reasons for such an
incident including failure of its system access or of
upstream applications. In all of the failure scenarios
tested, the defaulter could no longer submit
payments, but continued to receive them.
Consequently, the technical default of a participant
is simulated as follows: as of the opening of the
system, no payments are submitted by the
defaulter but it continues to receive all those made
by its counterparties. This is the worst case scenario
in terms of the length of the incident and the
behaviour of the participants. In terms of length,
this scenario assumes that the incident takes place
at the opening of the system and is not resolved
before the end of the day of transactions. In terms
of behaviour, it assumes a maximum “liquidity
sink” effect in the system because, in this case,
liquidity accumulates on the defaulter's account
while the latter is unable to redistribute it in the
system by submitting payments. In practice, we
observe that in the rare event of the technical
default of a participant in PNS, the other
participants continued to make payments normally
to the defaulter, but no incident has ever lasted
the whole day. This assumption differs from that
of the Bank of England which, in order to study
the consequences of the technical default of a
participant in its payment system CHAPS Sterling,
assumed that payments to defaulter stop ten
minutes after the incident occurs.7
For each actual day of transactions and each
participant, the following values were calculated.
• Theoretical lower bound of liquidity (LBL). This is
the minimum amount of liquidity that a participant
must transfer in PNS for all its payments to be settled.
The LBL of participant A is calculated as follows:
LBL (A) = max (Σ PA → X – Σ PX → A ’ 0)
X X
where X represents the counterparties of A and
X A P →  represents all the payments of A to X.
A participant in credit over the whole day
therefore has a LBL of zero.
4 In the current version of the simulator it is not possible to change the bilateral limits set by the participants during the day in PNS. These limits
are sometimes raised by participants before the closing of the system so that all the queued payments can be settled.
5 It should be noted, however, that there are minor differences between the bilateral limits used in the simulation and the real ones, as real limits
could not be obtained for all days of transactions.
6 Even though it is likely that this participant would not have tools to view and process the payments made by its counterparties.
7 The Bank of England, Assessing operational risk in CHAPS Sterling: a simulation approach, Financial Stability Review: June 2004. Based
on this assumption, the Bank of England set out to determine the point at which (date and time) an incident would have the greatest impact
by carrying out simulations using actual transaction data from February 2004.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 117
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• Theoretical lower bound of bilateral limits (LBBL).
The LBBL of participant A with participant B is the
minimum value of the bilateral limit necessary to
settle all payments from A to B:
LBBL (A → B) = max (PA → B – PB → A, 0)
Simulations with different levels of liquidity injected
into PNS8 and bilateral limits were carried out
(simulated liquidity levels and bilateral limits were
denoted LS and BLS respectively), by varying their
values between their “actual” value (i.e. that
observed during the actual days, and denoted AL
and ABL respectively) and their theoretical lower
bounds. In the rest of this article, the level of
liquidity simulated will be represented by an
indicator (α), and the level of the bilateral limits
simulated by an indicator (β) defined by the
following equations:
• level of liquidity simulated (α)
LS = LBL + α (AL – LBL) with α ∈ [0 , 1],
• level of bilateral limits simulated (β)
BLS = LBBL + β (ABL – LBBL)





Hence, with α = β = 1, the simulation is based on
the functioning of PNS with liquidity levels and
bilateral limits equal to their actual values and with
α = β = 0, the simulation is based on the functioning
of PNS with liquidity levels and bilateral limits equal
to their theoretical lower bounds. Lastly, β = ∞
enables us to model the functioning of the system
without bilateral limits.
The amount of liquidity simulated in PNS as a
function of α is shown in Table 1.
The value of the bilateral limits simulated as a
function of β is shown in Table 2 (as a percentage of
the actual bilateral limits).
In order to describe the impact of a default on the
overall functioning of PNS, the following indicators
were used:
•  the delay indicator. The delay indicator δ, which
describes the fluidity of the system, is defined as
follows:9
δ = Σ (tsettled,i  – tsent,i) mi i
Σ (tend  – tsent,i) mi i
wheremi is the value of the payment i ; tsent,iand tsettled,i
are the times of submission and settlement of
payment i respectively; tend is the time the system
closes, i.e. 4pm. Therefore, as the delay indicator
decreases, the fluidity of the system increases: δ= 0
when all the payments are settled immediately, and
δ = 1 when all the payments are settled at the end
Table 1
Amount of liquidity simulated as a function of α α α α α
α α α α α 1 5 7 . 0 0 5 . 0 5 2 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
y t i d i u q i L
) o r u e f o s n o i l l i b n i (6 9 0 . 72 3 7 . 60 7 3 . 67 0 0 . 69 8 7 . 54 4 6 . 5
d e t a l u m i s y t i d i u q i L
L A f o % a s a
0
0 0 0 0 17 8 . 4 97 7 . 9 85 6 . 4 88 5 . 1 84 5 . 9 7
Table 2
Value of bilateral limits simulated as a function of β β β β β
β β β β β 1 5 7 . 0 0 5 . 0 5 2 . 0 5 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 5 0 . 0 0
s t i m i l l a r e t a l i B
L B A f o % a s a d e t a l u m i s 0 0 17 3 . 6 75 7 . 2 52 1 . 9 27 6 . 9 14 9 . 4 12 2 . 0 18 5 . 9
8 All liquidity transfers between TBF and PNS were reduced by the same percentage, without changing the times of these transfers. For example
if a participant has made the liquidity transfers: EUR 100,000 at 8am and EUR 10,000 at 2pm from TBF to PNS, EUR 20,000 at 3.30pm
from PNS to TBF, then a simulation with a ratio of 0.9 will be carried out with the following liquidity transfers: EUR 90,000 at 8am and EUR
9,000 at 2pm from TBF to PNS, EUR 18,000 at 3.30pm from PNS to TBF.
9 This definition of the delay indicator was introduced by Risto Koponen and Kimmo Soramäki in the Article “Intraday Liquidity Needs in a
Modern Interbank Payment System. A Simulation Approach”, Bank of Finland, 1998.118 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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of the day. When modelling a technical default, the
delay indicator can be adjusted to solely take account
of payments between non-defaulting participants, as
we set out to identify the consequences of such a
default for the latter. In order to calculate this
indicator, the above equation is used, changing only
the value range of i, which no longer includes the
payments made to the defaulting participants;
• the rejected payments indicator. The number and
value of rejected payments provides a better
understanding of the risk resulting from the technical
default of a participant in the system. A distinction
was made between payments rejected between non-
defaulting participants and rejections of those made
to the defaulter. The number of rejected payments
calculated by simulation probably overestimates the
outcome of a real case scenario as it is likely that
some participants would be able to adjust their level
of liquidity accordingly, which was not simulated.
A number of other indicators were also used, such
as the percentage of payments settled in real time
in value and volume terms and the average time
payments spend in the queue. Their values were
calculated for each day of the month simulated, but
were not systematically analysed. These values
provide a complementary insight into the
underlying factors that affect the main indicators
described above.
3| NORMAL FUNCTIONING OF PNS
In order to determine, by comparison, the impact of
a default, the characteristics of a standard day of
transactions in PNS must be ascertained. So as to
better apprehend the normal functioning of the
system without taking account of defaulting
participants, a number of conditions of liquidity and
bilateral limits were simulated, varying α from 0 to
1 and β from 0 to infinity.
Charts 1 and 2 show the delay indicator (δ) and the
rejected payments for different levels of liquidity
(α) and bilateral limits (β). In each of the charts,
the delay indicator is given on the left-hand scale.
The right-hand scale shows the value of the rejected
payments as a percentage of the value of all
transactions in the system. In addition, the average
number of payments rejected daily is given above
each point.
The main observation emerging from these
simulations is that the system can function smoothly
with significantly lower liquidity levels and bilateral
limits than their actual values.
This conclusion is supported by the delay indicator,
whose upper bound reached δ = 0.165 (for a value of
δ = 0.09 with α = β = 1). The low values obtained
for the delay indicator show that PNS is a system
that functions broadly in the same way as a gross
settlement system. Indeed, even under the most
extreme conditions tested, δ remains very far from
δ = 1, which would correspond to the functioning of a
deferred net settlement system with a settlement at
the end of the day. This observation corroborates the
conclusions of a previous study conducted several
weeks after the PNS system went live.10
These simulations also show that there were almost
no rejected payments, even for low values of α and
β. Rejected payments only appeared at values below
β = 0.50; they are characteristic of situations of
gridlock that are not resolved by optimisation
algorithms (a value of β = 0.50 should theoretically
allow all payments to be settled).
However, participants in the system can change
their bilateral limits during the day. We can thus
assume that the few payments that were rejected
in the simulations would have actually been
released in reality by raising the bilateral limits.
Lastly, the use of optimisation mechanisms greatly
increases when β declines and more moderately
when α declines, which shows that these
mechanisms are more responsive to a decline in the
bilateral limits than to a decline in liquidity. These
mechanisms ensure the smooth functioning of the
system in conditions of tighter liquidity or limits.
10 “Les caractéristiques de fonctionnement des systèmes français de règlement de montant élevé TBF et PNS: quelques enseignements tirés de
travaux de modélisation”, Gilles Ryckebusch, Jean-François Ducher and Denis Beau, Banque de France Bulletin No. 71, November 1999.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 119
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Chart 1
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4| THE DEFAULT OF A PARTICIPANT
4|1 Without varying bilateral limits
The following analysis focuses on the consequences
of the default of the largest debtor in the system,
i.e. the participant with the highest value of total
payments over a given day.
The default of the largest debtor was simulated at
the start of the day by initially assuming that
non-defaulting participants do not change their
behaviour vis-à-vis the defaulter. In the model,
non-defaulting participants continue to submit
payments normally and do not change their bilateral
limits with the defaulter. A number of conditions of
liquidity and bilateral limits were tested by varying
α from 0.5 to 1 and β from 0.05 to infinity.
These value ranges enable us to test all the conditions
of bilateral limits in the system, from the lowest to
the highest values. A value of β = ∞ models the
functioning of a system that would not be
constrained by the existence of bilateral limits.11
The value range of α makes it possible to simulate
the functioning of the system with an amount of
liquidity equal to or below its actual value
(i.e. observed during actual transaction days). It is
useful to make simulations with an amount of
NB: Charts 1 and 2 show that almost no payments were
rejected (right-hand scale), even at much lower levels of
liquidity and limits than their actual values.
11 For technical reasons, due to the simulator's excessively long response time, the value β = 0, which models the functioning of PNS with the
bilateral limits set at their lower bound (LBBL), was not able to be tested. Simulations were carried out with values of β sufficiently close (β = 0.05)
to be able to extrapolate the functioning of the system at this level of limits.
Table 3
Payments settled using optimisation mechanisms
(as a % of queued payments)
β β β β β 5 0 . 0 = β β β β β 5 . 0 = e s a c l a u t c A α α α α α 5 . 0 = α α α α α 0 =
n o i t a s i m i t p o l a r e t a l i B1 7 . 0 60 0 . 1 36 1 . 9 28 4 . 1 36 5 . 5 3
n o i t a s i m i t p o l a r e t a l i t l u M4 3 . 80 5 . 37 4 . 36 3 . 37 5 . 5120 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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liquidity below that of actual liquidity because
participants generally use the same technical
platform to access TBF and PNS. Consequently, it is
likely that a participant in technical default in PNS
would also be in technical default in TBF, which could
result in tighter liquidity conditions in the system
and fewer liquidity transfers on the part of non-
defaulting participants to PNS and thus a lower
liquidity level α.
The impact of a technical default on the functioning
of PNS was measured using the three following
indicators: the delay indicator δ, the rejected
payments between non-defaulting participants (as a
percentage of payments between non-defaulting
participants, in value and volume terms) and rejected
payments made to the defaulter (as a percentage of
payments made to the defaulter, in value and volume
terms). Charts 3, 4 and 5 show the value of these
indicators for the different conditions of liquidity and
bilateral limits considered.
In a preliminary analysis, these indicators show that,
irrespective of the level of liquidity in the system
and the value of the bilateral limits set by the
participants, the impact of the technical default of
a participant on the functioning of the system and
the consequences for the non-defaulting participants
are very significant. Indeed, a technical default
leads, in all cases, to a considerable increase in the
delay indicator and a substantial number of rejected
payments between the non-defaulting participants.
Chart 3
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NB: Almost 10% (in value terms) of payments between
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The delay indicator provides information on how
smoothly the system is operating as a whole. It rises
sharply in the event of a participant defaulting, which
means that a greater number of payments are placed
in the queue and remain there for a longer time. It
also increases when the amount of liquidity in the
system (α) declines. This result is intuitive, because
a greater number of payments are queued due to
insufficient balances. Moreover, the tighter the
liquidity conditions in PNS (low values of α), the
less sensitive the delay indicator will be to the value
of the bilateral limits. This can mainly be ascribed
to the fact that when there are liquidity strains in
the system, payments are queued because of
insufficient balances before the bilateral limits are
reached. Lowering these limits therefore has little
impact on the functioning of the system.
Table 4
Queued payment data
h t i w s n o i t a l u m i S α α α α α = β β β β β 1 = t u o h t i W
r e t l u a f e d r e t l u a f e d h t i W
s t n e m y a p d e u e u Q
) s t n e m y a p l a t o t f o % a s a ( 0 9 . 2 45 1 . 3 6
e u e u q e h t n i t n e p s e m i t e g a r e v A
) s d n o c e s n i ( 0 5 8 , 17 7 6 , 2
Table 5
Delay indicator as a function of β β β β β
r o t a c i d n i y a l e D t u o h t i W
r e t l u a f e d
r e t l u a f e d h t i W
β 1 = δ 0 9 0 . 0 = δ 0 0 2 . 0 =
β 5 0 . 0 = δ 0 6 1 . 0 = δ 5 2 2 . 0 =
From Chart 4, it can also be seen that the number
and the value of rejected payments to the defaulter
are highly dependent on β (the lower the bilateral
limits are, the faster those set with the defaulter are
reached as the latter does not submit any payments),
but not very dependent on the level of liquidity α.
If β falls from 1 to 0.05 the proportion (in value
terms) of rejected payments rises from 25% to 65%.
The number and the value of rejected payments
between non-defaulting participants are very
sensitive to the level of liquidity and value of the
bilateral limits β. They increase when α declines,
and decrease when β declines. Furthermore,
sensitivity to β is much greater for low values of this
parameter. The following mechanism can be
observed: the lower the bilateral limits are, the
higher the number of rejected payments to the
defaulter. This results in non-defaulting participants
losing less liquidity and reduces the "liquidity sink"
effect, as these counterparties would then have more
liquidity to settle payments between themselves.
Chart 5 illustrates this mechanism: the number of
rejected payments between non-defaulting
participants is reduced by almost half when β
declines from 1 to 0.05.
Moreover, payments rejected between
non-defaulting participants are mainly those of large
value. The average value of a rejected payment
(EUR 76.1 million, where α = 1) is more than
50 times greater than that of the average payment
in PNS (EUR 1.5 million).
In the event of a technical default, the value of the
bilateral limits has a twofold influence. Firstly, the
lower the bilateral limits are, the greater the number
of queued payments. This increases the value of the
delay indicator and the number of rejected
payments. This mechanical effect was highlighted
in the first section of the study. However, low
bilateral limits contribute to reducing liquidity flows
(liquidity sink effect) to the defaulting participant,
which increases the amount of liquidity available
for the settlement of transactions between
non-defaulting participants. This effect results in a
reduction in the delay indicator and in the number
of rejected payments among non-defaulting
participants.
The second effect, whereby the number and the
value decline when β decreases, is a determining
factor for explaining rejected payments between
non-defaulting participants. Moreover, the
combination of the two effects gives an optimum
value of β (close to 0.50 for α = 1 or 0.75 and close
to 0.25 for α = 0.50), above and below which the
delay indicator shows a higher value.
Table 6
Payments received by the defaulter as a function of ß
) s n o i l l i b R U E n i (
ß ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 0 5 . 0 5 2 . 0 0 1 . 0 5 0 . 0
d e v i e c e r s t n e m y a P5 0 0 . 62 7 9 . 53 8 5 . 54 8 4 . 43 1 1 . 32 2 5 . 2122 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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4|2 Varying bilateral limits
In order to determine the extent to which changes
in the behaviour of a defaulter's counterparties are
likely to reduce the negative impact on the
functioning of PNS, scenarios were carried out in
which the bilateral limits of these counterparties
vis-à-vis the defaulter were changed.
In the scenario tested, the bilateral limits of the
non-defaulting participants vis-à-vis the defaulter
were changed immediately (as of the opening of the
system), and set at their theoretical lower bound 12.
This value enables non-defaulting participants to
ensure that all payments to the defaulter could be
settled if the latter were also able to submit
payments (below this level it would not be possible
to meet this condition). However, this value also
limits liquidity flows to the defaulter that is unable
to submit payments.
Several simulations were carried out with a liquidity
level α = 1 and varying the bilateral limits among
non-defaulting participants (β = 0.25; 0.50; 0.75
and 1). No simulations were conducted with both a
selective change in limits vis-à-vis the defaulter and
values of β below 0.25. Indeed, these conditions are
sufficiently close to those already simulated and
presented in Section 4|1 of this article (β =0.05 ; no
selective change vis-à-vis the defaulter) for the
results from the latter to be extrapolated.
Furthermore, given the probability that a technical
default may also affect the amount of liquidity
transferred between TBF and PNS, the study was
supplemented by a series of simulations in which
the amount of liquidity α was lower than its actual
value, α = 0.75. This series was tested with a value
of β = 0.50, which, on the basis of the preliminary
results obtained for α = 1, appeared to be the most
appropriate choice.
Chart 6
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Rejected payments to the defaulter
(as % of payments to the defaults)
12 It should nevertheless be noted that this exercise remains theoretical because this value is not a priori known by the participants, as they are
not necessarily aware of all the payments they expect from their counterparties.
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Chart 8
Rejected payments between non-defaulting
participants
(as % of payments between non-defaulting participants)
NB: If non-defaulting participants rapidly lower their
bilateral limit vis-à-vis the defaulter, the rejected
payments of among these participants (in value terms)
are reduced by over 40% when α = 1 but remain
significant (around 4.5%).
A preliminary analysis of the results obtained (Charts
6, 7 and 8) shows that when non-defaulting
participants react rapidly and set their bilateral limit
vis-à-vis the defaulter at its theoretical lower bound,
the consequences of the default are diminished, but
remain significant. In fact, the delay indicator is only
marginally reduced and the number of rejected
payments between non-defaulting participants,
although considerably lessened, remains substantial
(around 4.5% in value terms).
The decrease in the delay indicator is indeed very
slight irrespective of the value of β (around -2% for β
= 0.50), which suggests that setting bilateral limits
vis-à-vis the defaulter at their theoretical lower
bound only slightly improves the fluidity of the
system as a whole.
Furthermore, by a similar mechanism, as when
non-defaulting participants do not react selectively,
there is an optimum value of β that minimises the
delay indicator. This value is close to β = 0.50 for a
value of α = 1.
The impact of setting limits at their theoretical lower
bound is more pronounced on the number and the
value of rejected payments between non-defaulting
participants, which decline from 7.2% to 4.5% in
value terms and from 2% to 1% in volume terms
for a value of β = 0.5. They are also relatively
insensitive to variations of β.
Similarly to the observation in Section 4|1 of this
article  (without varying bilateral limits), the
payments rejected between non-defaulting
participants are mainly those of large-value. Indeed,
the average value of a rejected payment
(EUR 166.2 million, where α = 1) is over 110 times
greater than that of the average payment in PNS
(EUR 1.5 million).
Moreover, the existence of such limits significantly
increases the number and the value of rejected
payments to the defaulter, as the latter rise from 30%
to 80% in value terms and from 2% to 60% in volume
terms. These limits therefore result in a substantial
reduction of liquidity flows to the defaulter.
The indicators observed are relatively insensitive
to small variations in the amount of liquidity α in
Table 7
Reason for rejected payments to the defaulter and payments received by the latter when β β β β β = 0.5
(Rejected payments as a %, payments received in euro)
e u d s t n e m y a p d e t c e j e R
s t i m i l g n i d e e c x e o t
e u d s t n e m y a p d e t c e j e R
e c n a l a b t n e i c i f f u s n i o t
s t n e m y a P
y b d e v i e c e r
r e t l u a f e d e h t
s m r e t e u l a v n I s m r e t e m u l o v n I s m r e t e u l a v n I s m r e t e m u l o v n I
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r u o i v a h e b g n i g n a h C 0 3 . 2 85 0 . 8 90 7 . 7 15 9 . 12 0 7 , 2 3 2 , 5 7 6 , 1
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the system. On the basis of the results obtained with
α = 0.75, the delay indicator and rejected payments
between non-defaulting participants only increase
marginally compared with results obtained with α = 1.
Furthermore, for all the indicators concerned, the lower
the value of β is, the lower the impact of a selective
setting of bilateral limits vis-à-vis the defaulter. This
result is intuitive because the lower the value of β, the
closer the case observed will be to that observed in
Section 4|1 of this article (uniformly low limits).
A number of simulations were also conducted by varying
the value of the threshold below which payments can
bypass the FIFO rule and by increasing the number of
multilateral optimisations. These simulations showed
that these two parameters have a relatively low impact
on the indicators observed (see Table 8).
Table 8
Impact of the threshold below which payments can bypass the FIFO rule and optimisations
The results of the study show that the impact of the technical default of a participant on the fluidity of
transactions in the large-value payment system PNS is significant and may disrupt the system's smooth
functioning. Such a default results in an almost doubling of the delay indicator and causes payment rejections
among non-defaulting participants of up to 10% of total transactions (in value terms). However, an appropriate
use of risk management tools enables participants to greatly reduce the impact of a technical default.
Preventive actions and a rapid response on the part of the other participants are required. Indeed, as a
preventive measure, setting bilateral limits at a lower level than that actually observed in the system makes
it possible to reduce liquidity loss in the event of a default, while having an insignificant impact if the system
is functioning normally. Moreover, by responding rapidly to information indicating a technical default and
adapting their bilateral limits vis-à-vis the defaulter, non-defaulting participants can significantly reduce the
impact of such a default on their own transactions. Simulations also showed that there are optimum values
for these limits in order to minimise the impact on payments between participants, which are lower than
those actually set by participants in the system.
This study confirms the usefulness of the introduction, already planned by the system operator, of a
function that makes it possible to submit payments on behalf of the defaulter. This would reduce the risk
from such a default by partially redistributing the liquidity “trapped”  in the defaulter's account.
These simulations supplement the assessments of PNS carried out by the Banque de France as part of
its payment systems oversight duties, in particular by shedding more light on the capacity of the system
to function smoothly in the even of “shocks” and highlighting the mechanisms to damp such shocks.
The results obtained for the PNS system make it possible to better understand the consequences that
might arise from the technical default of a participant in a system with comparable characteristics, and
above all illustrate the importance of the appropriate use of bilateral sender limits in a system with a
similar risk management tool. This is the case for TARGET 2, which the Eurosystem has scheduled to go
live in 2007, to replace its current network of large-value payment systems linked to TARGET.
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